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Why Central Banks Need to Take Human Rights More Seriously1 
Daniel Bradlow2 
Most central bankers think that there is a tenuous connection between the operations of 
central banks and human rights. They think that this is not a problem because, as unelected 
officials, it would be inappropriate for them to take policy decisions that require political 
judgements. Their responsibility is to concentrate on the relatively narrow set of macro-
economic variables that are relevant to their mandates and to leave to their country’s political 
leadership the decisions dealing with the complex and politically sensitive variables that 
affect the functioning of the economy and society. Moreover, they contend that they do not 
need to make such decisions. Their mandates require them to make decisions that must be 
implemented within time horizons that are too short to incorporate the relatively slow pace of 
the social changes that lead to sustainable human rights progress. They may add that if they 
do their job effectively they will help create a macro-economic environment that can 
facilitate the realization of human rights over time.    
This position is no longer tenable. Climate change is forcing the central banking community 
to rethink their view of their responsibilities. The recent release of the Network for Greening 
the Financial System’s first comprehensive report on climate change as a source of financial 
risk3, is the latest indication that central banks are beginning to take environmental risks more 
seriously in their monetary and financial operations. They can no longer treat the 
environment as fixed, in the sense that it is changing too slowly to affect current monetary 
and financial policy.   
Their focus on climate change is inevitably pushing central banks to start paying more 
attention to other environmental risks and to social considerations more generally. For 
example, in order to fully understand the risk that climate poses to price and financial 
stability over the relevant time horizon, they will have to consider not only the risk of an 
extreme weather event but how changing weather patterns will affect such variables as food 
production, migration patterns, social stability and how these, in turn, will influence demand 
in the economy, credit allocation, inflation, government deficits and people’s access to food, 
water, housing, jobs and social security. 
In other words, central bankers are being inexorably pushed to consider the relationship 
between central banking and human rights, particularly economic and social rights. This 
article briefly describes this relationship and its implications for central banks. It makes two 
points in this regard. First, central banks have human rights responsibilities. Second, both 
their monetary and financial operations have unavoidable human rights impacts which need 
to be incorporated into their decision making and governance procedures. In order to make 
these points the paper is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the human rights 
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responsibilities of central banks. The second part discusses how they should deal with their 
human rights responsibilities. The third part is a conclusion. 
The Connections Between Central Banks and Human Rights 
Central banks are created by law in their home states.4  It determines their mandates, powers, 
and governance arrangements. They also must operate in compliance with all the applicable 
law including the constitutional and international legal obligations of their home state. Thus, 
in principle, central banks must take the international human rights commitments of their 
sovereign into account in the way in which they implement their mandates and conduct their 
operations.  
While the precise mandates of central banks vary, all central banks are responsible for 
maintaining price stability. Their primary policy tools for achieving this objective are interest 
rates, the capital and reserve requirements for banks, and trading debt instruments in financial 
markets.  In the past, central banks have used other policy tools to maintain stable prices, 
such as the quantity of money in the economy or a fixed standard, such as the gold standard.  
Central banks also act as a lender of last resort to the banking system or more generally to the 
financial sector, regulate and supervise the activities of banks and other financial institutions, 
manage the country’s payment system, maintain financial stability and manage the foreign 
reserves of the country. In some countries, the central bank may be assigned additional 
responsibilities such as promoting development finance or financial inclusion.  
Many, but not all central banks operate independently of their political leadership.5 It is 
important to note that usually their independence is limited to instrument independence. This 
means that the central bank does not sets its own monetary policy objectives but determines 
for itself how it will use its policy tools to meet this goal. For example, the political 
leadership determines that inflation should be maintained within a specified range over a 
certain period of time and then lets the central bank decide how to use its policy tools to 
maintain inflation within this target zone. 6  
This arrangement has two consequences. First, it means that the central bank’s independence 
is ostensibly limited to the technical issues regarding the best way to reach the goals that the 
government has set. Second, since the political leadership sets the goal, it is assumed, at least 
implicitly, that the social, environmental and political implications of the country’s monetary 
and financial policies are its responsibility and not that of the central bank.  Thus, the central 
bank is not assumed to be publicly accountable for the social or environmental impacts of its 
decisions. This assumption is strengthened by the relatively short time horizons (about 18-36 
months) which central banks use in their monetary operations. 
4	The major exception to this general rule is the European Central Bank. It was created by Articles 127-133, 
282-4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union available at:
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However, in reality central banking is not a purely technical function. As indicated above, a 
central bank’s operational decisions will have environmental and social as well as monetary 
or financial implications within the time period used by the central bank in its decision-
making. For example, the social and environmental impacts, but not necessarily the monetary 
impacts, of its decision to change interest rates will vary depending on how it implements the 
decision. If the central bank decides to change the rates by trading in financial instruments the 
social and environmental impacts will be determined by which instruments it chooses to trade 
and in what proportions, and by the size and the timing of these transactions.7 On the other 
hand, the central bank could cause a different set of social and environmental impacts if it 
chose to implement the decision by changing the reserve requirements for banks or the 
interest rate it charges banks for short term loans. In these cases, the social and environmental 
impacts will depend on how the banks change their credit allocation decisions in response to 
the central bank’s action. 
This means that the central bank’s operational decisions can affect the risk and reward 
calculations of financial institutions so that they allocate more or less of their resources, for 
example, to government financing, green technologies, carbon intensive businesses, luxury 
apartments, low income housing, small and medium size businesses or multinational 
corporations. Similarly, their decisions regarding the factors that can affect financial stability 
and the way in which they exercise their lender of last resort responsibilities will have social 
and environmental impacts. For example, central banks could be under-estimating financial 
risks if they fail to incorporate such things as the impact of climate change on the availability 
of food and water and on migration patterns into their decisions regarding the risks to 
financial stability.8 In this regard, it is noteworthy that some central banks, for example those 
of China, England and the Netherlands, have begun to incorporate environmental risks into 
their financial stability assessments. Similarly, the central banks of Kenya, the Netherlands 
and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco consider such factors as community 
development and financial inclusion in their stewardship of their financial systems. The 
Dutch central bank, in fact, now has a mandate to include sustainability in its decision 
making and the Chinese central bank has been authorized to take climate considerations into 
account in its monetary decisions.  
The fact that the operations of central banks inevitably have social impacts means that they 
cannot avoid having an impact on the social and economic rights of the citizens of their 
countries. This means that their decisions to change interest rates and how they are 
implemented, to support/not support banks in distress, and how much risk to tolerate in the 
financial system can affect the access of some people in the society to housing, healthcare, 
education, work and to adequate food and water. It may also have implications for the 
security of their pensions and for the quality of their environments.  
7	For example, in its open market operations to implement interest rate decisions, the US Federal Reserve, 
pursuant to Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act, id, can trade, inter alia, Treasury securities, and securities of 
any agency of the United States. The South African Reserve Bank is authorized to trade in treasury bills, and 
any government debt issued for any commercial, industrial or agricultural purpose or by a local authority. See 
Section 10(g), South African Reserve Bank Act, available at: 
https://www.resbank.co.za/AboutUs/Legislation/Documents/SARB%20Act/1)%20%20South%20African%20R
eserve%20Bank%20Act,%201989%20(Act%20No.%2090%20of%201989).pdf 
8 The information in this paragraph is taken from D. Schoenmaker, “Greening Monetary Policy”,  Breugel 
Working Paper Issue# 02 (19 February 2019); “A Call for Action: Climate Change as a Source of Financial 
Risk”, First Comprehensive Report, Network for Greening the Financial System (April 2019) 
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The Human Rights Responsibilities of Central Banks 
The unavoidable impact of central banking operations on human rights means that central 
banks have to develop a better understanding of their human rights responsibilities and its 
implications for their decision making and operations. The applicable law is the starting point 
for this analysis. However, while the relevant law and jurisprudence may define the human 
rights obligations of the state in some detail, it is unlikely to provide detailed guidance on 
how the central bank in that state should operationalize these requirements. Thus, the central 
bank will have to determine for itself how to do this.  
A good reference tool in this regard is the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights.9 These principles stipulate that all businesses should have a human rights policy and 
should conduct adequate human rights due diligence before and during their decision making 
and implementation process. The former requirement is usually interpreted to mean that the 
senior leadership of the entity should adopt a human rights policy that is publicly available 
and that should be applied in the operations and decision-making of the entity. The latter 
requirement means that they should conduct human rights impact assessments of their 
proposed operations. They should also then take steps to avoid or mitigate all adverse human 
rights impacts.  
It is important to note that central banks will face particular challenges in meeting their 
human rights responsibilities. Since they are public institutions, whatever human rights policy 
they adopt may have implications for other state owned entities and for the political 
leadership in the country. This however, will complicate but not render impossible the task of 
drafting a central bank human rights policy. The drafters will need to ensure that the policy is 
respectful of the central bank’s independence, monetary and financial mandates and its 
human rights responsibilities while not contradicting the human rights policies of their home 
state in general and other parts of the government involved in economic policy making in 
particular.  This suggests that there needs to be some dialogue between central banks and the 
political authorities about the implications of the central bank’s proposed human rights 
policy.  
Central banks will also experience unique challenges in conducting human rights impact 
assessments. For example, in regard to their monetary policy, the central bank’s ability to 
conduct detailed human rights impact assessments is complicated by the relative speed and 
discretion with which they must operate. This does not however make it impossible to assess 
human rights impacts. Instead, it suggests that central banks need to develop and maintain a 
sufficiently detailed general understanding of their actual human rights impacts so that they 
can make informed judgements about the likely impacts of their proposed monetary 
decisions. A similar approach should be taken towards all the other functions performed by 
the central bank. This means that the human rights impacts of each of these functions should 
be analyzed to more fully understand both their positive and negative human rights impacts.  
9	Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf. The UN 
Human Rights Council endorsed these principles in its resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2011. Another useful 
reference too is the Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Economic Reforms, that were 
prepared by the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International Financial 
Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, particularly Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and submitted to the UN Human Rights Council, Document A/HRC/40/57 (25-February—22March 
2019) available at:  
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/443/52/PDF/G1844352.pdf?OpenElement 
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One consequence of these assessments is likely to be that it will push central banks to assess 
if their current decision making and operational procedures and practices are appropriately 
designed to identify, assess and, if necessary respond to these impacts.This analysis can be 
updated periodically to ensure that central bank decision makers are fully informed about the 
human rights impacts of their proposed decisions.  
In this regard, it is important to note that a human rights impact assessment can provide the 
central bank with an important and novel benefit. This follows from the fact that the human 
rights impact assessment focuses on the impact of central bank operations on individuals and 
communities. This disaggregated approach offers central banks a more detailed and nuanced 
understanding of how its policies actually affect different sub-groups of their society and thus 
of the true costs and benefits of their policies and actions.  
Second, acknowledging their human rights responsibilities means that the central banks are 
also recognizing that their unelected leaders in fact are making decisions that affect the rights 
of citizens. Although this reality is unavoidable, it does raise questions about the governance 
and independence of central banks. It is important to note that this does not mean that central 
banks should lose their independence. The reason is that there are monetary benefits 
associated with having an independent central bank that need to be protected. In addition, 
there are costs that would be associated with allowing the political leadership to use the 
central bank’s increased attention to human rights to undermine the central bank’s instrument 
independence.   
This suggests that there will need to be a re-evaluation of how central bank independence can 
be protected while striking the optimal balance between the central bank’s human rights and 
monetary and financial responsibilities. This will require creative thinking about alternate 
ways in which central banks can be held accountable for their compliance with their 
monetary, financial and human rights responsibilities. It may also require reassessing the 
central bank’s appointment process for its policy makers and the appropriate level of 
stakeholder participation in this processes. In this regard, attention should also be paid to the 
implications of these changes for the optimal functioning of financial markets, financial 
institutions and the economy.  
Conclusion 
The above analysis demonstrates three key points. First, central banks cannot operate without 
having social impacts and thus without impacting human rights. Second, human rights offers 
central banks a new tool for understanding the true costs and benefits of their proposed 
actions as well as useful additional information that can help them identify ways to mitigate 
the adverse consequences of their action. Third, central banks can meet their human rights 
responsibilities without compromising the independence they need to effectively meet their 
monetary and financial responsibilities.   
